A veteran journalist wrote to me (and I assume to many other leaders in the American Jewish community) earlier this week requesting my thoughts about what “winning” the Israel-Hamas War might look like. This is my response:  

Dear …

Thank you for asking.

First, it’s important to emphasize that I’m not an Israeli citizen. My kids don’t serve in the Israeli military. I don’t pay Israeli taxes though I contribute financially to multiple Israeli causes that promote democracy, justice, religious pluralism and peace in the Jewish state. Only Israeli citizens have the responsibility to determine the nature of Israel’s policies in war and peace and on matters of security as they are the ones who must live directly with the consequences of the decisions they take. Yet, I have thoughts that I have every right to share with Israelis and Israel’s leadership about Israeli policies that I believe compromise Israel’s own liberal and enlightened principles as articulated in its Declaration of Independence. Not only that. I also have that right because what Israel does affects directly the security, standing and identity of Diaspora Jewry as is now so very clear post-October 7. The dramatic rise in the United States and around the world of antisemitism, anti-Zionism and anti-Israel sentiment challenges our Jewish security and identity.

In answering your question I’m hard-pressed to imagine a “win” in this war. Too many Israelis are dead, injured and traumatized. Too many thousands of innocent Palestinian civilians have died and been injured and southern Israeli communities and the Gaza Strip lay in ruins. Gazans are facing widespread famine and disease. Israeli society, despite the unity of the people in the initial few months of this war is still deeply polarized between right-wing super-nationalist settlers, extremist ultra-Orthodox Jews and their sympathizers as opposed to the majority of Israeli citizens who are politically, religiously and culturally centrist, center-left or center-right.

For the Jewish people to claim any kind of a “win” in the context of this awful war after October 7, however, I would hope that the following would materialize, sooner rather than later. I am well aware of the obstacles within Israeli public opinion based on a new survey published by the Israel Democracy Institute on Tuesday, February 20 as reported by Haaretz (I attach that article below with a few notes of introduction).

Here is what I believe, taken all together, that would constitute a “win” for Israel in this war:

-The return of all Israeli and international hostages to their families and communities as soon as possible;

-The defanging of Hamas as a military threat to Israel and as a brutal autocratic extremist Islamic governing authority over Gaza that subjugates its own people and has brought about the destruction of Gaza and the death and injury of tens of thousands of its own citizens;

-A ceasefire agreement based on the above;

-Massive humanitarian aid flowing into Gaza to stave off famine and disease;

-The holding of new Israeli elections ASAP resulting in the formation of a moderate and centrist ruling coalition government that includes at least one Arab Party – without Benjamin Netanyahu anywhere near the Prime Minister’s office and without super-nationalist, settler, racist right-wing and ultra-Orthodox political parties as part of the ruling government coalition;

-The holding of new refashioned Palestinian Authority elections ASAP and the formation of a moderate, non-violent and compromising government coalition – without the inclusion of Hamas or any militant political party that rejects the right of the Jewish people to a state in the Land of Israel-Palestine;

-Israel’s public endorsement of a pathway to the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israel in the West Bank and Gaza with its capital in East Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinians to the State of Palestine and not Israel;

-The restoration of Israel’s international image as a nation that values democracy, pluralism, justice, human rights and peace with the Palestinian people and Israel’s neighbors;

-The Arab League’s acceptance of the State of Israel and the establishment of full diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between all western-aligned Arab nations and the Jewish state;

-An international commitment to assist the Palestinian Authority (and not Hamas) in rebuilding Gaza, and an international commitment to assist in rebuilding southern Israeli communities devastated by Hamas’ terrorist attack on October 7;

-A dramatic decrease in antisemitism abroad especially in the United States and on college and university campuses that has spiked dramatically since October 7;

-An impetus for young liberal American Jews to learn Israeli history, culture and politics and spend time living in the Jewish state thereby affirming their emotional and moral ties with Israelis and the Jewish state.

If Israelis and Palestinians, with the support of the United States, Arab League, UK, EU, and UN could embrace all the above, it would be a “win” for Israel, for the Palestinian people and for the western world.

Introductory notes to the following Haaretz Poll of Current Israeli Opinion:

Current Israeli public opinion is far from acceptance of many of the positions I list above. The details of the most recent poll – including Israeli Jews and Israeli Arab citizens – are reviewed in the following Haaretz news item.

It has to be understood when reading the details of this poll that Israel is still at war and the hostages are still being held by Hamas. Israelis are rightly focused on these immediate challenges and the majority of the population is not projecting too far out into the future. However, Israeli dissatisfaction with PM Netanyahu’s extremist right-wing super-nationalist government has grown dramatically since October 7. Saturday night protests that characterized the pre-October 7 period over almost a full year are growing weekly and calling simultaneously for negotiations that would lead to the return of the remaining hostages and for new Israeli elections.

It is estimated that the current Israeli coalition government would win only in the low 40s the number of Knesset seats (as opposed to 64 today out of 120 total Knesset mandates) if a new election were to be held today and that the opposition led by Benny Gantz of the National Unity Party would win close to 70 Knesset seats. However, PM Netanyahu has no intention of resigning or calling for new elections not only because he wants to hold onto power but also to stay out of jail should he be convicted of the three crimes of which he has been indicted. The political parties in his right-wing government know that if the government were to fall each likely would find itself with fewer seats in the next Knesset and consequently outside the future ruling coalition government. There is little to encourage any of those parties to call for new elections before the next scheduled election in October 2026.

It is likely that once the dust of the fighting in this war begins to settle there will be room for Israelis to consider more expansively what might be Israel’s future with the Palestinians and the wider Middle East.

This is clearly a fraught time and most everyone in Israel recognizes that there is no return to October 6. The massacre on October 7 and the ensuing war may well be regarded historically as among the most important inflection points in the 75-year history of the State of Israel. Those of us who love Israel and believe in Israel’s promise despite everything that has happened since October 7 must do everything we can to stay close to our Israeli brothers and sisters while advocating alongside those in Israel itself for policies that will assure Israel’s future democracy and character as a Jewish state. Too much is at stake for Israel and the Jewish people around the world to do otherwise. We need to remember as well that the State of Israel is the most remarkable achievement of the Jewish people in the past 2000 years.

Here is the Haaretz article and the most recent poll of Israeli citizens:  

Most Israelis Say ‘Absolute Victory’ in Gaza Unlikely, According to New Poll

Haaretz | Israel News – February 21, 2024

The term ‘absolute victory’ was deliberately chosen as it has become a phrase favored by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during press conferences and foreign language interviews, although he is disinclined to define what that actually means

Most Israelis do not believe an “absolute victory” in the war in Gaza is likely. This according to a new survey published by the Israel Democracy Institute on Tuesday. The survey, which was conducted on the internet and by telephone, polled 510 men and women in Hebrew and 102 in Arabic as a representative sample of the entire adult population of Israel aged 18 and older.

An End to the War?

Of those polled, 51 percent of Jewish respondents and 77.5 percent of Arab respondents said there is a low likelihood of achieving absolute victory. The term “absolute victory” was deliberately chosen as it has become a phrase favored by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during press conferences and foreign language interviews, although he is disinclined to define what that actually means strategically.

Among the Israeli Jews surveyed, those on the political right tended to agree with Netanyahu (55 percent), saying there is a high likelihood of achieving “absolute victory,” while the majority of the left (84 percent) and in the center (63 percent) said there is a low likelihood.

With the possibility of a total military victory unlikely in the eyes of most participants, the survey also asked their opinion regarding a political agreement to the end of war.

The question was posed as “Would you support or oppose an agreement to end the war which includes the release of all the hostages, long-term military quiet with guarantees from the United States, and a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia, in return for the release by Israel of large numbers of Palestinian prisoners, an extended ceasefire, and agreement to the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state in the long term?”

Among Jewish respondents, a majority of 55 percent oppose such an agreement, but the share of those who support it increased from 29 percent when the question was asked in January to 37 percent in February. In the Arab sample, 77 percent are in favor of a political agreement and only 9 percent are opposed.

Humanitarian Aid?

Regardless of the final outcome of the war, the question of humanitarian aid remains relevant, as the threat of famine and disease currently looms large over the population of Gaza.

With UNRWA currently embroiled in controversy, survey participants were asked their opinion regarding whether Israel should allow the transfer of humanitarian aid to Gaza residents at this time, via international bodies that are not linked to Hamas or UNRWA.

A majority of Jewish respondents (68 percent) oppose the transfer of humanitarian aid even under these conditions, while a large majority of Arab respondents (85 percent) support it. In recent months, there have been regular demonstrations held at the Kerem Shalom crossing, with protestors attempting to block aid trucks from entering the Gaza Strip.

Here again, there seems to be a strong correlation between political affiliation and one’s answer to the question, with 59 percent of those on the Left supporting allowing international bodies to transfer aid and 80 percent of those on the Right opposed.

Survey respondents who identified themselves as Center were almost evenly divided on the issue (44 percent support, 51.5 percent oppose, 4.5 “don’t know”).

Establishment of a Palestinian State?

On Wednesday, the Knesset voted to approve the government’s decision to oppose any unilateral declaration of the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The vote took place amid calls by a growing number of international leaders for the establishment of an independent and demilitarized Palestinian state. Respondents were asked where they fall on this question, with two-thirds of the Jewish sample opposing such a proposal and a large majority (73 percent) of Arabs supporting it.

The survey also questioned whether those surveyed believed that the establishment of a Palestinian state would lead to an increase in Palestinian terrorism against Israel.

Among Arab respondents, 41 percent thought that terrorism would cease altogether. It is worth noting that 35 percent of Arabs polled selected the “don’t know” option. Among Jews, the most common view (44 percent) was that terrorism would become even stronger.

Protests Returning?

Over the past several weeks, the once-massive protests against Netanyahu’s government, which were largely put on hold after Hamas’ attacks on October 7, have begun to return.

Survey respondents were asked if they thought the demonstrations would get back to their pre-war numbers with 60 percent anticipating they would come back and 30 percent saying they do not foresee such a return. On this issue, there was almost no difference between the percentage of Jews (60 percent) and Arab (64 percent) who believe the public protests will come surging back.

Compared to the high percentage of respondents who believe that wide-scale protests will re-erupt, a much smaller share think or are certain that they themselves would participate. As expected, those on the left (in the Jewish sample) consider themselves most likely to take part; 59 percent as opposed to 31 percent of the center and only 13 percent on the right.

What’s Next for the Northern Front?

As tens of thousands of residents from Israel’s northern border communities enter their fifth month of evacuation, the survey asked about future security in the north and their eventual return.

Respondents were given two possibilities for ensuring a safe return home for northern residents: an internationally mediated political agreement that distances Hezbollah from the border or an all-out attack on Hezbollah forces in Lebanon.

There was a large difference between Jewish and Arab responses to this question, with 53 percent of Jewish favoring an all-out attack and 69 percent of Arabs supporting a political agreement.

Among Jewish responses, a majority (61.5 percent) on the left support the diplomatic option that distances Hezbollah from the border, a view they share with about half of those in the center (51 percent). On the right, a solid majority (65 percent) are in favor of an Israeli offensive.

Opening Notes:

In the wake of October 7 and in the midst of Hamas holding more than 130 Israeli and international hostages, the fighting in Gaza and the devastation of Palestinian communities in the Gaza Strip, few in Israel are thinking seriously about a 2-state solution and the end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as much as they may yearn for such an outcome. Intense skepticism about peace always animates populations in the context of war, especially one that has lasted as long as Israel’s War of Independence. The trauma inflicted on Israelis by the Hamas’ butchery, massacre and gang rapes of 1200 Israelis and Hamas’ criminal hostage taking on October 7 followed by Israel’s massive military response to destroy Hamas and the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians have traumatized both Israelis and Palestinians. But an end to this war and the return of the remaining hostages will come and hopefully sooner rather than later.

October 6 is long gone and in Israel’s rear-view mirror. The Jewish state cannot return to the former status-quo in which every few years, in response to Hamas firing thousands of missiles into uncontested Israeli settlements, Israel responded in a campaign called “mowing the grass” (i.e. taking out some of Hamas’ fire power but leaving Hamas’ infrastructure in tact). Perhaps I’m being overly optimistic and seeing only the half-full glass, but taking a 10,000-foot view I remember well the devastation and loss of Israeli life brought about by the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and only five years later the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement and then the Jordanian-Israel peace agreement. I remember as well the violence of the first Intifada and Israel’s military response that led eventually to the Oslo peace process.

Saudi Arabia and other western-oriented Arab nations told US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken last week that they want peace with Israel and the development of a western alliance led by the United States against Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other Shiite Iranian-backed militias, but the price Israel must pay is to agree to establish a path to a Palestinian state. Of course, the problems are manifold, not the least of which is that the Likud Party platform (the party of Benjamin Netanyahu), written in 1977, states: “The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is eternal and indisputable and is linked with the right to security and peace; therefore, Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] will not be handed to any foreign administration; between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty.”

The “Greater Israel” position that a Jewish state must control all land from the river to the sea has always been Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, despite his dishonest lip-service to President Obama in 2009 at Bar Ilan University where he said that he agreed to a Palestinian state. He has never favored the establishment of a State of Palestine next to Israel. He worked consistently to dismantle the Oslo peace process, expand the settlement enterprise (against international law), divide the Palestinian people by supporting Hamas, and seeking to make a contiguous Palestinian state impossible.

Palestinian ideological extremism that doesn’t accept Israel on any land between the river and the sea also is a major problem, and Hamas’ influence is a serious road-block to any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

The idea of a “divorce” between Israel and a future state of Palestine roughly along the Green Line (i.e. the 1949 armistice line) was promoted in the Oslo process and gained majority support from Israelis and Palestinians at the time. While some Israeli leaders still think a 2-state solution along these lines of divorce is still possible, another option has been developing called “Eretz l’Kulam – A Homeland for All,” known as a “Con-federal Two State” model (for details see https://www.alandforall.org/english/?d=ltr).

In both proposals, security is the over-arching concern for Israelis and Palestinians. Consequently, Hamas cannot be part of a ruling coalition of Palestinian governance. Nor can the extremism of Israel’s racist super-nationalist parties be central in any Israeli government. Non-violence must be an operating principle for both peoples. The Palestinian state would have to be demilitarized with security cooperation established between the two states.

No one can impose a solution on Israel or the Palestinians. Making peace will depend on visionary leadership amongst both peoples. Neither PM Netanyahu nor PA President Mahmud Abbas can lead the way. Neither has the vision, courage or the support of their peoples. New elections and new coalitions must come first. Getting from here to there consequently will be especially difficult. Yet, we’ve seen before in modern history that substantial transformative thinking led former enemies to make peace after WWII between the United States, Germany and Japan and after the decades-long violence in Northern Ireland. Why not between Israel and the Palestinians?

What is certain is that the status-quo is unsustainable. It may be from the ashes of this massive tragedy of massacre and war that a phoenix will arise and new possibilities will emerge to offer hope for a better and more peaceful, secure and just future.

The following article appeared in today’s The Times of Israel by David Makovsky and is worth reading. Makovsky directs the Project on Arab-Israel Relations at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the co-author with Dennis Ross of the new book Be Strong and of Good Courage: How Israel’s Most Important Leaders Shaped Its Destiny. He is also the host of the new podcast Decision Points: The U.S.-Israel Relationship.

“Most Israelis would support a deal if they thought it would succeed, but first they’d need to overcome their genuine reasons for skepticism.

The Biden administration hopes to use a hostage release deal to pivot from the Gaza war to a broader historic regional breakthrough between Israel and Saudi Arabia, notching a crucial strategic victory against destabilizing forces in the Mideast. With its public upset by Palestinian civilian casualties during the post-10/7 Israel-Hamas war, the Saudis have now made irreversible movement towards a Palestinian state a prerequisite for such a breakthrough.

In this context, the Washington Post reported on Thursday that the US and several Arab states are in rapid-fire discussions to develop a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace plan with a “firm timeline” for the establishment of a Palestinian state. While this is likely a trial balloon – perhaps initiated by Arab officials – and it is far from clear if the White House will sign off on the specific dates or a detailed plan for a Palestinian state, some want a quick demonstration of progress to dampen tensions expected to rise during the month of Ramadan, which starts on March 10. The timeline for an actual agreement is short due to the upcoming American elections: the Biden administration wants to seal a Saudi deal before summer when the presidential campaign is in full swing.

This plan has, unsurprisingly, upset many in Israel, who feel this would effectively reward Hamas for its massacre of Israelis. In both the Post article and some other analyses, the Netanyahu government and Hamas are presented as the only real hang-ups to a grand deal that would reconcile Israel and many Arab states while achieving a two-state solution. 

Yet Israeli reservations about a Palestinian state go well beyond Netanyahu and are based on real and urgent concerns, security chief among them. This must be dealt with seriously by linking progress on Palestinian statehood to meeting clear security benchmarks, without which instability is certain. An American effort that does not take this into account risks misreading Israeli politics and the concerns of a majority of Israelis across the political spectrum. 

Israeli support for two states, a strong majority in the heady days of the 1990s Oslo process, has eroded for years. The national trauma of the slaughter of 1,200 Israeli innocents – some beheaded, burned alive and raped – on October 7th and the ensuing war further hardened public opinion. In January, 59% of Jewish Israelis rejected a two-state solution as part of a package of US guarantees, normalization with Arab states, and long-term military peace. Support for two states is tied to perceptions of its feasibility, and Israelis have grown increasingly skeptical: a month before October 7, only 32% of Israeli Jews thought Israel and a Palestinian state could coexist peacefully, down 14% from 2013. 

The core reason for this opposition is more practical than ideological. Many Israelis support the idea of a compromise for peace but are wary of abandoning the status quo without an agreement with a partner they trust will provide real security and actually end the conflict. While a dedicated minority view the West Bank as biblical patrimony which cannot be ceded, in January 2023 over 60% of Israelis were willing to accept mutual Israeli-Palestinian recognition of the other’s legitimate claims, an end to the conflict and the end of future claims under a two-state solution. If Israelis thought a deal would work, a majority would support it. They understand that, if successful, a two-state solution is the best way to ensure Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state. 

For now, though, most Israelis associate two states with a profound security risk and prefer the status quo, despite its dangers. That concern is well-founded: for the past 30 years, Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian arena has often – albeit not always – led to violence, not peace.

Though Israel withdrew from West Bank cities during the Oslo process, the second Intifada erupted soon after US-led peace talks broke down in 2000. Over 1,000 Israelis were killed, many of them in suicide bombings. Withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 saw Hamas evict the mainstream Palestinian Authority (PA) from there in mere days in 2007 with a small core of heavily armed fighters, then spend 16 years developing rocket factories and a sprawling subterranean fortress unimpeded. This was a crucial point. When the chips were down, nobody stopped Hamas from outmuscling and outmaneuvering the PA. Israel has been living with Hamas control ever since. The year 2007 was not a moment in time. Rather, it changed the very trajectory of Gaza control. 

Beyond the Israeli-Palestinian arena. withdrawal from the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon did not bring peace with Hezbollah. Instead, it let the group consolidate control despite a war with Israel in 2006, ignore UN Resolution 1701 to develop an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and missiles, some precision-guided, and deploy 6,000 Radwan commandos near the border. A second critical turning point from which Israel did not recover. Israel was forced to evacuate 60,000-80,000 civilians from its northern border region shortly after October 7 for fear of a similar attack.

A fail-safe mechanism

The failures of Gaza and Lebanon, underscored by Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s continued unrelenting denial of Israel’s right to exist, shattered the premise – key to any peace deal – that withdrawal makes Israel safer. The lesson for Israelis is simple: without durable and substantive enforcement of demilitarization of a future Palestinian state, any political solution to the conflict will be under permanent threat. 

To be sure, Palestinians have ample reason to distrust Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly endorsed a two-state solution in 2009, but later renounced it, and several key figures in his cabinet oppose a Palestinian state on ideological grounds. Continued settlement expansion has also damaged perceptions of the feasibility of two states.

While this government likely cannot be swayed, American strategy needs to separate ideological opposition to a Palestinian state from the larger group of Israelis whose resistance stems from security concerns. To convince a majority of Israelis to support a two-state solution and evacuate West Bank settlements, there must be a fail-safe mechanism to ensure a Palestinian state remains demilitarized. Vague principles are insufficient.

Ensuring success for a future Palestinian state requires fixing the asymmetry between strong non-state actors and weak states that drives chronic instability in many Middle Eastern countries. Too often, those who fire the shots call them. The first step, which Israel is already doing, is to remove Hamas’s military capabilities and weaken it enough to be contained by Palestinian security forces.

Then, a future Palestinian state must provide dignity and sovereignty for the Palestinians and be strong enough to deal with extremist actors like Hamas, without militarizing and posing a security threat to Israel. This is a delicate balance without international parallels: none of the 15 demilitarized states worldwide are in conflict zones. But it is not impossible. 

Past proposals for demilitarization outlined a Palestinian state without an air force, armor, or heavy weaponry, but with strong internal security, police, and counterterrorism forces to maintain internal order. Israeli-Palestinian intelligence and occasional operational cooperation would continue. The key ingredient is a third party capable of simultaneously guaranteeing demilitarization and survival of the fledgling Palestinian state. This third party would oversee border security to prevent arms smuggling, verify demilitarization by checking for weapons factories and more, and deconflict between Israeli and Palestinian forces. After all, the US wants a Palestinian state to look like Costa Rica, but with good reason rooted in experience, Israel fears a non-careful withdrawal means a Palestinian state will be a dangerous mini-Iran. 

The six Arab states that have peace with Israel could theoretically serve this function, but there is no evidence that they want to be seen as using force against fellow Arabs. And if most Arab states will not even condemn the October 7 atrocities, what would those guarantees be worth?

Without a very serious ‘coalition of the willing’ of significant states prepared to confront bad actors, the US or NATO seem to be the only options. The US maintains a military presence in dozens of countries like Germany and South Korea on their request without eroding their sovereignty. 

The idea of deploying American troops or NATO will be unattractive to Americans and Israelis alike. Americans want to avoid dangerous foreign entanglements and Israelis have no desire to complicate US-Israel relations: they are proud that Israel defends itself by itself, and do not want American lives at risk. Israel could serve as the initial guarantor and eventually turn over authority, since it will want the ability to intervene if the PA proves unable to contain Hamas. This would likely be interpreted as an extension of the military occupation, however, and could be politically unacceptable. Hence, the need for a transition.

These critical details should not obscure the main point. Recent history indicates any discussion of a two-state solution without an accompanying enforcement mechanism is a recipe for failure. The US needs to push for a Palestinian state that actually works: otherwise Hamas and other violent extremists will overtake it and October 7 will repeat itself.”